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PREEMPTION OF STATE PRODUCT LIABILITY CLAIMS
INVOLVING MEDICAL DEVICES: PREMARKET
APPROVAL AS A SHIELD AGAINST LIABILITY
Robin Helnick Turner
Abstract: Under the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA), Congress established a
complex scheme for regulating medical devices. Congress also included an express
preemption provision in the Amendments that prohibits states from imposing different or
additional requirements on devices. Much controversy has focused on whether the preemption
provision operates to preempt plaintiffs' state product liability claims against medical device
manufacturers. Although in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr the U.S. Supreme Court recently
attempted to resolve the controversy, its ruling left open the question of whether
manufacturers of devices subject to the most rigorous form of Food and Drug Administration
scrutiny, known as premarket approval review, should be immune from product liability
lawsuits. This Comment argues that the overall purpose behind the MDA, the Lohr decision,
and the federal interpretative regulations support preempting product liability claims
involving devices subject to premarket approval review. This Comment concludes that
product liability claims should be preempted to the extent that such claims involve aspects of
devices addressed by premarket approval rules.

An explosion in scientific knowledge in the late twentieth century has
produced remarkable advancements in medical device technology.
Medical devices such as CAT scanners, pacemakers, and kidney dialysis
machines play a central role in diagnosing, treating, and preventing
illness.' Currently, Americans spend approximately forty percent of their
health care dollars on medical devices.2 In 1976, Congress enacted the
Medical Device Amendments ("MDA"),3 which established a complex
regulatory system for medical devices. To prevent states from interfering
with federal regulation of medical devices,4 Congress included an
express preemption provision in the MDA.5 This provision prohibits
states from imposing different or additional requirements on medical
devices.6 The MDA's preemption provision, however, does not mention
1. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-853 (1976), reprinted in An Analytical LegislativeHistoryof the Medical
Device Amendments of 1976, app. EE[(Daniel F. O'Keefe, Jr. et al. eds., 1976); see generally Rodney
R. Munsey, Trends andEvents in FDA Regulation ofMedical Devices Over the Last Fifty Years, 50
Food & Drug L.. 163 (1995).
2. Susan Bartlett Foote, Managingthe MedicalDevice Arms Race 4 (1992).
3. Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 353-395
(1994)).
4. H.R. Rep. No. 94-853, at 45.
5. 21 U.S.C. § 360k (1994).
6. 21 U.S.C. § 360k.
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state product liability law,7 leading courts and commentators to

vigorously debate whether it preempts plaintiffs' state product liability
claims involving medical devices.8
In Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,9 the U.S. Supreme Court attempted to
resolve the controversy by addressing whether the MDA's preemption

provision bars plaintiffs from suing manufacturers of defective medical
devices under common law theories of product liability.'0 In Lohr, the
Court held that none of the plaintiffs' claims were preempted by MDA
rules.1 Lohr raised more questions than it answered, however, because
the Court's ruling depended heavily on an MDA loophole under which
the device in question was marketed." This loophole allowed the device
manufacturer to avoid the most rigorous scrutiny of its :product, known
as premarket approval ("PMA") review. 3 Instead, the manufacturer
marketed its product rapidly, regulated by only basic MDA rules. 4 Thus,
Lohr failed to resolve the crucial issue of whether the Court's preemption
analysis would have been different if the device had been subjected to
the stringent PMA review process.

This Comment argues that the Congressional purpose underlying the
preemption provision, the logic and reasoning of Lohr, and the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) regulations support preempting state product
liability claims that involve aspects of devices addressed by PMA rules.

7. In this Comment, the phrase "product liability claims" encompasses state law actions sounding
in negligence, strict liability, and warranty. Courts differ as to what plaintiffs' claims against device
manufacturers should be called. Some courts refer to these claims as "common law claims," see, e.g.,
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996), whereas others use the temi "state law damages
actions," see, e.g., Duvall v. Bristol-Myers-Squibb Co., 103 F.3d 324 (4th Cir. 1996). This Comment
uses the term "product liability claims" because it indicates that these claims involve products, and it
also recognizes that some product liability claims are not based on the common law, but rather on
statutes such as the Uniform Commercial Code.
8. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1453, 1459 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 2579 (1996) (ruling that MDA never preempts state product liability claims); Robert S.
Adler & Richard A. Mann, Preemption andMedical Devices: The Courts Run Amok 59 Mo. L. Rev.
895, 942-45 (1994) (same). But see, e.g., King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1139-40 (1st Cir.
1993) (holding that MDA preempts all of plaintiff's product liability claims); Mark Herrmann &
Geoffrey J. Ritts, Preemption and Medical Devices: A Response to Adler and Mann, 51 Food &
Drug. LJ. 1 (1996) (same).
9. 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996).
10. Id. at2245.
11. Id at 2259.
12. See id. at 2247. The device in Lohr was subject to minimal FDA scrutiny known as section
51 0k review. See infra Part LB.
13. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e (1994); see also infra Part I.B.
14. See 21 U.S.C. § 360(k) (1994); see also infra Part LB.

Preemption of Product Liability Claims by the MDA
Part I details the MDA's classification scheme and its history. Part II
describes the MDA's preemption provision and how it has been
interpreted by the FDA and by courts. Part II then argues that state
product liability claims are within the scope of the MDA's preemption

provision and that PMA rules should preempt state law. Finally, Part IV
sets forth policy justifications for granting preemptive effect to PMA
rules and concludes that the FDA is uniquely qualified to make decisions
regarding device regulation.
I.

THE MEDICAL DEVICE AMENDMENTS OF 1976

Throughout most of this century, medical devices have received
minimal government scrutiny, resulting in thousands of injuries. 5 Before

1976, the FDA did not have statutory authority to review devices before
they reached the market. 16 Consequently, many people were harmed by
risky and faulty devices. 7 Between 1960 and 1970, medical devices
caused at least 10,000 injuries, including 731 deaths. 8
In response to the public outcry over injuries resulting from dangerous
devices such as the Dalkon Shield, 9 Congress enacted the Medical
Device Amendments of 197620 (MDA) to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act of 1938.2" Congress's purpose in enacting the MDA was to ensure
the safety and effectiveness of medical devices.' A medical device is

broadly defined as any item "which does not achieve its primary

15. Robert Adler, The 1976 Medical Device Amendments: A Step in the Right Direction Needs
Another Step in the Right Direction,43 Food Drug Cosm. LJ.511,512 (1988).
16. David A. Kessler et al., The FederalRegulation ofMedical Devices, 317 New Eng. J. Med.
357,357 (1987).
17. Susan Bartlett Foote, Loops and Loopholes: Hazardous Device Regulation Under the 1976
Medical Device Amendments to the Food,Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 7 Ecology L.Q. 101, 102-03
(1978).
18. Iat
19. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-853, at 8 (1976), reprinted in An Analytical Legislative History of the
Medical Device Amendments of1976, app. III (Daniel F. O'Keefe, Jr. et al. eds., 1976). The Dalkon
Shield is an intrauterine contraceptive device which, after only five years on the market, was linked
to sixteen deaths and twenty-five miscarriages. Id.
20. Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 353-395
(1994)).
21. Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395
(1994)).
22. Preamble, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976); see also Adler & Mann, supra note 8,at
911 (arguing that "[t]he primary purpose of the Amendments was to expand consumer protection
against dangerous devices").
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intended purposes through chemical action." This definition gives the
FDA jurisdiction over more than 100,000 different medical devices in
1700 categories.'
A.

ClassificationofDevices

The MDA established a complex classification system for regulating
devices according to their relative degree of risk.' Under the MDA, the
FDA is required to assign all devices to one of three classes, dictating the
level of regulatory controls placed on devices.26
Class I and class II devices are low and medium risk devices that
receive minimal FDA scrutiny before they are marketed. Examples of
class I devices include tongue depressors and bed pans.' Class I devices
are regulated by broad guidelines known as general controls,2" which
establish basic rules governing device labeling29 and manufacturing
quality control processes.30 These general controls also apply to the other
two classes of devices. 3 Examples of class II devices include tampons
and oxygen masks. 2 Devices are categorized as class If when general
controls are insufficient to ensure device safety and effectiveness.3
Class II devices are subject to special controls such as performance
standards,34 which are device-specific standards established by the FDA
that regulate the components, construction, and performarce of devices. 5

23. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (1994).
24. General Accounting Office, Medical Device Regulation: Too Early to Assess European
System's Value as Modelfor FDA (GAO/HEAS-96-65 1996) [hereinafter 1996 GAO Report].
25. Kessler et al., supranote 16, at 358.
26. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(a)(1) (1994).
27. Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1418 (5th Cir. 1993); Adler, supra note 15, at 512.
28. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(IXA)(i).
29. 21 C.F.R. § 801.109(b)-(c) (1996).
30. 21 C.F.R. §§ 820.20-.198 (1996).
31. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(f) (1994); 21 U.S.C.§ 360c(a)(1)(A).
32. Stamps, 984 F.2d at 1418.
33. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B).
34. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B). Other special controls include post-market suiveillance and patient
registries. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B).
35. 21 U.S.C. § 360d(a)(2)(B)(i) (1994). At present, few performance standards have been issued
by the FDA. See Kessler et al., supra note 16, at 361. Critics argue that the lack of performance
standards for almost all class I devices results in two rather than three device classifications. Id.;
Robert B. Leflar, PublicAccountability andMedical Device Regulation, 2 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1, 4243 (1989).

966

Preemption of Product Liability Claims by the MDA
The FDA has categorized over eighty percent of the 1700 different types
of devices as class I or class 11.36
Before manufacturers may market class I or class II devices, they must
comply with relatively simple disclosure rules called section 510k
notification.37 Section 510k rules require manufacturers to submit an
application to the FDA containing a description of the device, the class to
which the device belongs, proposed labeling, and a description of the
actions taken to comply with all applicable requirements.3 8
Class III devices are subject to the most stringent MDA rules.39 The
FDA places a device into class III for one of two primary reasons. First,
the FDA categorizes a device as class III if general and special controls
are insufficient to ensure the safety and effectiveness of the device, and
the device is life-sustaining or poses unreasonable safety risks.40 Second,
the MDA mandates that all devices introduced into the market after
May 28, 1976 are automatically designated as class III, regardless of the
risks they pose, unless they qualify under two limited exceptions: (1) the
device is sufficiently similar to a class I or class II device marketed after
the enactment of the MDA,4 or (2) the FDA places the device into a
lower class because it is not a high-risk device.42 Class III devices
constitute about twelve percent of all devices.43 Before marketing a
class III device, a manufacturer normally must obtain FDA approval of a
device's safety and effectiveness, which is known as premarket approval

(PMA).

36. General Accounting Office, Medical Devices: FDA Review Time 3-4 (GAO/PEMD-96-2
1995) [hereinafter 1995 GAO Report].
37. 21 U.S.C. § 360(k) (1994). Section 510k notification is also called premarket notification. See
Adler, supra note 15, at 513.
38. 21 U.S.C. § 360(k); 21 C.F.R. § 808.87 (1996).
39. Kessler et al.,
supra note 16, at 358.
40. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C) (1994). A device may also be designated as a class III device if it is
"for a use which is of substantial importance in preventing impairment of human health," or if it
"presents a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury." 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C).
41. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(f)(1)(A).

42. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(f(I)(B).
43. 1995 GAO Report, supra note 36, at 4. About three percent of all device types have not been
classified. Id
44. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e (1994).
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PremarketApproval and SubstantialEquivalency

Gaining PMA is often a costly and time-consuming process for
manufacturers.4" Before the FDA will grant PMA, it must be reasonably
assured that a device is safe and effective in its design, manufacturing,
and labeling.46 PMA rules require manufacturers to submit an application
to the FDA containing a full report of all clinical and laboratory tests
regarding the device's safety and effectiveness,47 a full statement of the
components and design of the product,4" a full description of the
manufacturing process and the quality controls for naanufacturing, 4"
sample labeling instructions, and other detailed information." The FDA
thoroughly reviews all information contained in the application and
determines whether the product should be marketed at all and under what
conditions.5" If the FDA approves a device, manufacturers must comply
with those design parameters submitted to the FDA in their PMA
applications.53
Despite Congress's concern over the safety and effectiveness of
class III devices, most class III devices on the market have escaped PMA
review because of the two exceptions provided by the MDA. 4 To
45. Adler, supra note 15, at 519; see also Kessler et al., supra note 16, at 359.
46. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(2).
47. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1)(A).
48. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1)(B).
49. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1)(C).
50. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1)(F).
51. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c).
52. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(2) (outlining reasons for denying PMA); see also 21 U.S.C. § 360j(e)
(1994) (authorizing FDA to restrict sale, distribution, or use of device to minimize its potential for
harmful effects).
53. 21 C.F.R. § 814.80 (1996).
54. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2247 (1996). In addition to these two common
exceptions, the MDA outlines other exceptions to the requirement that all class MI devices must
undergo PMA review. See 21 U.S.C. § 360j(m) (providing humanitarian exemption from PMA
requirements for devices intended to benefit fewer than 4000 people in U.S.); 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g)
and 21 C.F.R. §§ 812.1-.150 (1996) (authorizing FDA to exempt certain investigational devices
from PMA requirements for limited time to allow manufacturers to conduct clinical investigations of
devices if manufacturers comply with other FDA rules to ensure safety of investigations). In light of
Lohr, courts have attempted to determine whether FDA regulations promulgated under the
investigational device exception (IDE) constitute preemptive federal requirements that displace
plaintiffs' product liability claims. See, e.g., Martin v. Teletronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 105 F.3d 1090,
1099 (6th Cir. 1997) (ruling that plaintiff's claims against manufacturer of IDE device were
preempted because such claims would thwart Congress's goal of encouraging development of new
devices through IDE exception); Berish v. Richards Med. Co., 937 F. Supp. 181, 185 (N.D.N.Y.
1996) (holding that IDE requirements displace state product liability claims). A more thorough
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prevent market disruption, 5 Congress provided that all class III devices
marketed prior to the MDA's enactment on May 28, 1976 are exempt
from PMA requirements until the FDA specifically calls for their
review. 6 The second exception to PMA review was created to prevent
pre-MDA class III devices from gaining an unfair competitive advantage
because of their temporary exemption from PMA requirements." This
exception, known as "substantial equivalency," allows manufacturers of
class III devices marketed after May 28, 1976, to temporarily avoid the
PMA process by demonstrating that their products are substantially
similar to a pre-MDA device. 8 Manufacturers of substantially equivalent
devices do not have to submit PMA applications until the FDA
specifically calls the applications. Approximately eighty percent of all
class III products are marketed as substantially equivalent devices, thus
temporarily exempting such devices from PMA review.59
Substantially equivalent devices are cleared through a modified
section 510k process. 6° Manufacturers of these devices must submit a
basic section 510k application with additional information reporting
safety and effectiveness problems associated with the device. 6' In about
fifteen percent of these cases, the FDA also requires manufacturers to
provide clinical and laboratory data to support their claims of substantial
equivalence,62 thus making section 510k applications more akin to PMA
applications. Nonetheless, significant differences between the two
premarket clearance procedures persist and are illustrated by the fact that
the FDA spends an average of 1200 hours on each PMA submission in

discussion of preemption of claims involving IDE devices, however, is outside the scope of this
Comment because of the extensive differences between IDE and PMA review.
55. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. at 2247.
56. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(A); 21 C.F.R. § 814.1(c)(1) (1996). The FDA has not commenced the
PMA process for most grandfathered class III devices. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. at 2247 n.3.
57. Adler & Mann, supra note 8, at 914.
58. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i) (1994). The FDA considers a device to be substantially equivalent if it
shares the same technology as the predicate device or, even if the technologies differ, if there is
sufficient information demonstrating that the new device is as safe and effective as the previously
marketed device and does not raise additional questions of safety or effectiveness. 21 U.S.C.

§ 360c(i).
59. H.1. Rep. No. 101-808, at 18, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6305,6312 (1990).
60. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(3)(A).
61. See 21 C.F.R. § 807.87(h)(2) (1996).
62. The Wilkerson Group, Inc., ForcesReshaping the Performance and Contribution of the U.S.
Medical Device Industry, report prepared for Health Indus. Mfrs. Ass'n 70 (1995); see also Adler,
supranote 15, at 516-17.
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contrast to an average of twenty hours on a section 510k application.63
One commentator has noted, "[t]he attraction of substantial equivalence
to manufacturers is clear. A 510(k)... [application.' requires little
information, rarely elicits a negative response from the FDA, and gets
processed very quickly."'
II.

PREEMPTION

The controversial aspect of the MDA has not been its classification
system, but rather its express preemption provision.65 Although
commentators agree that the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution
grants Congress the power to preempt state product liability claims, they
disagree as to whether Congress intended to exercise this power in the
MDA. 6
The Supremacy Clause provides that the laws of the United States
"shall be the supreme Law of the Land."'67 State laws that "interfere with,
or are contrary to the laws of Congress" are invalid.68 Under the
Supremacy Clause, federal laws may preempt state laws through express

preemption or implied preemption.69 Express preemption occurs when
Congress declares in a statute its intent to displace state law.7 ° Implied
preemption occurs when a court infers from a statute's structure and
purpose that Congress intended to preempt state law.7'
Regardless of which type of preemption is involved, the Supreme
Court has stated that two principles must guide a court's preemption

63. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S.Ct. 2240,2247 (1996).
64. Adler, supra note 15, at 516.
65. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
66. See id.
67. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl.
2.
68. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,211 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.).
69. See Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (observing
that Congress may expressly preempt state law, or its intent to displace state law may be inferred).
70. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
71. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). In the absence of an express
preemption clause, preemption occurs where Congress passes an extensive statutory scheme that
effectively occupies the field of regulation, see, e.g., Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la
Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982), or where state law actually conflicts with federal law, see, e.g.,
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,
204 (1983). A more thorough discussion of implied preemption is beyond the scope of this Comment
because the MDA contains an express preemption clause. Where there is an express preemption
clause that reliably indicates that Congress intends to preempt state law, there s no need to conduct
implied preemption analysis. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517.

Preemption of Product Liability Claims by the MDA
analysis.72 First, courts should presume that states' historic police powers
are not superseded by federal law unless preemption is the "clear and
manifest purpose of Congress."73 Second, courts' decisions must be
guided by the principle that "'tlhe purpose of Congress is the ultimate
74
touchstone' in every pre-emption case."
A.

The MDA 's Express Preemption Provision

The MDA contains an express preemption provision that prohibits
states from establishing or enforcing:
any requirement-(I) which is different from, or in addition to, any
[federal] requirement applicable under this chapter to the device,
and (2) which relates to the safety and effectiveness of the device or
to any other matter included in a [federal] requirement applicable to
the device under this chapter.75
This provision, codified as 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a), demands that three
conditions be satisfied before a state law is preempted: (1) there is a
federal requirement applicable to the device; (2) there is a state
requirement that is different from, or in addition to, the federal
requirement; and (3) the state requirement concerns the safety or
effectiveness of a device or any other aspect of a device regulated by the
MDA.
Much controversy has surrounded section 360k(a) and what types of
federal rules and state laws qualify as requirements under it.76 The
legislative history of section 360k(a) provides little information
regarding which state laws Congress intended the provision to preempt
or which federal device rules should trigger preemption. The only
relevant information about the preemption provision is contained in a
House of Representatives report, which indicates that the purpose of
section 360k(a) is to prevent interstate commerce from being "unduly
burdened" by states imposing different or additional requirements on

72. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240,2250 (1996).
73. Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).

74. l (quoting Cipollone,505 U.S. at 516).
75. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994). The FDA may grant exemptions to states that wish to establish or
enforce laws that are more stringent than the federal laws governing medical devices. 21

U.S.C. § 360k(b).
76. See supranote 8 and accompanying text.
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devices.77 In the absence of information regarding the intended scope of
the preemption provision, courts and the FDA have embarked on their
own attempts to interpret the provision.
B.

The FDA 's Interpretationof Section 360k(a)

As the federal agency charged with implementing and enforcing the
MDA,78 the FDA has issued regulations interpreting section 360k(a).79
These regulations significantly restrict the kind of state law that qualifies
as a "state requirement,"
and they narrow the definition of a "federal
80
requirement."
Under the FDA's interpretation of section 360k(a), a state requirement
includes a "statute, ordinance, regulation, or [a] court decision."' Not all
state laws falling into one of these four categories, however, will be
subject to preemption. The FDA excludes from its definition of state
requirements "requirements of general applicability," whi.ch are laws that
do not relate exclusively to medical devices.8 2 Nonetheless, this
exclusion is not absolute. Although state laws of general applicability
usually are not superseded, the regulations specify that when a law of
general applicability "has the effect of establishing a substantive
requirement . . . [that] is different from, or in addition to, a Federal
requirement," it will be preempted.8 3
FDA regulations also adopt a narrowing definition of preemptive
"federal requirements" under section 360k(a). 84 The regulations specify
two types of federal rules that trigger preemption.8 ' First, "specific
counterpart regulations" promulgated by the FDA that are applicable to a
particular device qualify as federal requirements.86 Second, "specific

77. H.1. Rep. No. 94-853, at 45 (1976), reprinted in An Analytical Legislative History of the
MedicalDevice Amendments of.1976, app. III (Daniel F. O'Keefe, Jr. et al. eds., 1976).
78. 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (1994). Although the MDA gave the Secretary oF Health and Human
Services authority to promulgate regulations under the Act, the Secretary subsequently delegated her
authority to the FDA. See Lohr, 116 S. Ct. at 2249 n.5.
79. See 21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (1996).
80. See 21 C.F.R. § 808.1.
81. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(b).
82. See 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d).
83. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(6)(ii).
84. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d).
85. See 21 C.F.R1 § 808.1(d).
86. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d).
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...[federal rules] applicable to a particular device" that are included
within the MDA itself also constitute federal requirements. 7

C. JudicialInterpretationof the Scope of Section 360k(a)
1.

Pre-LohrCases

Until the 1990s, courts generally rejected the argument that the MDA
preempted state product liability claims."8 They viewed the MDA and its
regulations as establishing the minimum, rather than the maximum,
standard of care required by product liability law. 9 However, courts
became more amenable to preemption arguments after Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc.90 In Cipollone, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an
express preemption clause in the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of
19699' encompassed some state tort claims.92 Although Cipollone did not
involve the MDA, courts faced with the issue of whether the MDA
preempted state product liability claims relied on the decision because
the preemption clause at issue mirrored the MDA's preemption
provision.93
After Cipollone, courts adopted one of three different interpretations
of section 360k(a).94 First, the majority of federal courts held that the
MDA preempted all state product liability claims. 95 Generally, these
87. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d).
88. Gary L. Wilson, Listen to the FDA: The Medical Device Amendments Do Not Preempt Tort
Law, 19 Hamline L. Rev. 409, 412 (1996). Those instances in which courts did find preemption
generally involved cases where the FDA had promulgated device-specific regulations such as
performance standards for class II devices. Id.
89. See Adler & Mann, supra note 8, at 916.
90. 505 U.S. 504 (1992). In Cipollone, the son of a smoker sued a cigarette manufacturer under
various product liability theories for his mother's death. Id.at 508.
91. Pub. L. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1994)).
The express preemption bars states from imposing "requirement[s] or prohibition[s] based on
smoking and health .. . with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes," if a
manufacturer has complied with the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1334.
at 549 (Scalia, J. and Thomas, J., concurring
92. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 523 (plurality opinion); id.
in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
93. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1268, 1275-76 (7th Cir. 1995), vacated, 116
S. Ct. 2576 (1996) (vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
Cir. 1993).
116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996)); King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1134 (Ist
94. See Anne-Marie Dega, Comment, The Battle over MedicalDevice Regulation: Do the Federal
MedicalDevice Amendments PreemptState Tort Law Claims?, 27 Loy. U. Chi. L.. 615, 633 (1996)
(describing three general positions courts assumed).
95. See, e.g., Martello v. CIBA Vision Corp., 42 F.3d 1167, 1168-69 (8th Cir. 1994) (ruling that
product liability claims asserted against manufacturer of lens disinfection system were preempted),
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courts reasoned that because the MDA establishes a comprehensive set
of rules regulating devices, state product liability claims would
necessarily impose requirements that were "different from or, in addition
to," MDA device rules, and thus such claims should be preempted under
97 the
section 360k(a).96 Second, in Kennedy v. Collagen Corporation,
Ninth Circuit rejected the majority position and held thai: the MDA does
not preempt any state product liability claims. Citing FDA regulations
that state that section 360k(a) does not preempt laws of general
applicability, the court concluded that the plaintiff's state claims should
not be preempted, because they were based on general theories of
product liability.98 Third, in Feldt v. Mentor Corp.,99 the Fifth Circuit
adopted a moderate approach and held that the MDA preempted some
claims but not others. Focusing on the language in section 360k(a), the
court announced the rule that only those state claims that attempt to
regulate aspects of devices already governed by federal rules should be
preempted, because only then do the state claims impose different or
additional requirements within the meaning of section 360k(a).°°
2.

Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr

With much diversity in the decisions concerning the preemptive scope
of the MDA, the issue was ripe for resolution by the U.S. Supreme
Court. The Court answered this call when it granted certiorari in
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr.1°1
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2614 (1995); Gile v. Optical Radiation Corp., 22 F.3d 540, 541 (3d Cir.
1994) (finding product liability claims involving interocular lens were preempted); Mendes v.
Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13, 18-19 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that plaintiff's claims of negligent
manufacture and distribution, failure-to-war, and breach of express and implied warranty regarding
pacemaker were all preempted); Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1420-21 (5th Cir. 1993)
(holding that PMA rules preempt state law tort claims for defective design, inadequate warnings, and
failure to warn); King, 983 F.2d 1130, 1139-40 (ruling that all of plaintiff's state product liability
claims against manufacturer of anti-wrinkle device were preempted).
96. See cases cited supra note 95.
97. 67 F.3d 1453 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that none of claims asserted against manufacturer of
anti-wrinkle treatment that had undergone PMA review were preempted).
98. Id. at 1458-59.
99. See, e.g., Feldt v. Mentor Corp., 61 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 1995) (ruling that inadequate warning
and labeling claims against manufacturer of substantially equivalent device that had undergone
section 510k review were preempted by general controls, but that defective design claims were not
preempted because there were no federal design requirements imposed on device), vacated, 116
S. Ct. 2575 (1996) (remanded for reconsideration in light of Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240
(1996)).
100. Id. at435.
101. 56 F.3d 1335 (1Ith Cir. 1995), afdinpartand rev'd inpart,116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996).
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In Lohr, a recipient of a pacemaker, Lora Lohr, and her husband sued
the manufacturer of the pacemaker after it allegedly failed, causing
complete heart block. °2 The pacemaker was a class III product marketed
as a substantially equivalent device, which had undergone section 510k
review. 3' The plaintiffs' complaint contained negligence and strict
liability counts alleging defective design, manufacturing, and labeling."
The defendant, Medtronic, asserted that federal device rules preempted
all of the Lohrs' claims. In a 4-1-4 decision, the Court held that the
MDA's purpose and legislative history, as well as the FDA's
regulations, mandated that none of the Lohrs' claims be
interpretative
16
preempted.
A majority of the Court determined that common law actions impose
state requirements within the meaning of section 360k(a).'0 7 This
majority was comprised of the four dissenting justices' 8 and Justice
Breyer, who concurred in part and concurred in the judgment of the
plurality." 9 These five justices declared that state product liability claims
are within the scope of section 360k(a)." ° They reasoned that Cipollone
required product liability claims to be included within the definition of a
state requirement because they could find no basis upon which to
distinguish the language in section 360k(a) from the preemption
provision at issue in Cipollone."' According to the justices,
"requirement" easily encompasses obligations that take the form of
common law rules given that "'[state] regulation can be as effectively
exerted through an award of damages as through some form of
preventative relief.""' 2 Insofar as the MDA preempts a state requirement
embodied in a positive enactment of law, the justices concluded that it
also preempts state common law claims that would impose requirements

102. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240,2248 (1996).

103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Maat 2258 (majority opinion); id. at 2261 (Breyer, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 2259 (Breyer, J., concurring); id at 2263 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
108. Justice O'Connor wrote the dissenting opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia and Thomas.
109. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. at 2259 (Breyer, J., concurring).
110. Id.
111. Id (Breyer, J., concurring); i& at 2262-63 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 2259 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 505 U.S. 504,
521 (1992)); id at 2262 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (same).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 72:963, 1997

that are3different from, or in addition to, requirements imposed under the
MDA.1
A different majority of the Court, however, concluded that none of the
Lohrs' claims were preempted by federal device rules because neither
section 51 Ok notification rules nor general controls governing all devices
ll4
qualified as preemptive federal requirements under section 360k(a).
With respect to the plaintiffs' defective design claims, die Court found
that section 510k review does not constitute an FDA finding of safety
and effectiveness that could preempt state requiremenis involving the
pacemaker's design." 5 According to the Court, section 510k rules do not
preempt state-imposed design requirements because the design of
substantially equivalent devices "has never been formally reviewed
under the MDA for safety or efficacy.".. 6 Rather, FDA approval of a
section 510k application only ensures that a product is "no more
dangerous and no less effective than" a pre-1976 device." 7 In the
absence of federal design requirements, the Court held that liability
claims premised on the theory that a manufacturer should have employed
a different product design do not impose different or additional state
requirements."'
Relying on the FDA's interpretation of section 360k(a), this same
majority found that the general controls governing manufhcturing quality
control processes and device labeling-the only other significant rules
applicable to the pacemaker-did not preempt the plaintiffs' claims
based on allegedly defective manufacturing or labeling.' Quoting FDA
regulations, the Court declared that state requirements are preempted
only when the "FDA has established 'specific countelart regulations
or... [there are] other specific requirements applicable to a particular
device' under the MDA. 20 According to the Court, general controls do
not qualify under either of these preemptive categories because they
"reflect important but entirely generic concerns about device regulation
generally, not the sort of concerns regarding a specific device or field of
113. Id. at 2260 (Breyer, J., concurring); id.at 2263 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 2258. This majority was comprised of Justice Stevens, author of the principle opinion,
who was joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer, who concurred in
part and concurred in the judgment.
115. Id. at 2254.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 2255.
119. Idatat2258.
120. Id. at 2257 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (1995)).
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device regulation which the statute or regulations were designed to
protect from contradictory state requirements.''
Although divided on the issue of whether product liability claims
constitute state requirements within the meaning of section 360k(a), the
justices unanimously agreed that product liability claims alleging
violations of the MDA are not preempted." Quoting FDA regulations,
the Court explained section 360k(a) "'does not preempt State or local
requirements that are equal to, or substantially identical to, requirements
imposed by or under"' the MDA. The Court explained that when
plaintiffs premise liability on a manufacturer's failure to comply with
federal device rules, the claims are identical to MDA requirements and
thus should not be preempted." Even when a state's tort law requires a
plaintiff to prove not only that a manufacturer failed to comply with
federal law, but also that the violation was the result of negligent
conduct, the Court observed that the plaintiffs claim does not constitute
a different or additional requirement under the MDA.'"
3.

Post-Lohr Cases

In spite of the Court's attempt to resolve the circuit split concerning
the preemptive scope of section 360k(a), Lohr's narrow holding left
many questions unanswered.2 6 Although Lohr conclusively established
that section 51 Ok rules and general controls do not preempt state product
liability claims, the Court failed to address whether PMA rules preempt
product liability claims. Most post-Lohr courts have held that PMA rules
do not preempt product liability claims.2 7 Nonetheless, courts have
failed to agree on a single rationale for rejecting preemption.

121. ld at2244.
122. See id. at 2256 (majority opinion); id. at 2264 (dissenting opinion).
123. ld at 2256 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 808.5 (1995)).
124. Id. at2255.
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., Green v. Dolsky, 685 A.2d 110, 115-17 (Pa. 1996) (stating that although Lohr
answered some questions regarding section 510k rules, decision does not provide sufficient guidance
for analyzing preemptive scope of PMA rules), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1432 (1997).
127. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Optical Radiation Corp., 50 Cal. App. 4th 580, 595 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996) (finding that PMA rules trigger preemption, but rejecting preemption on grounds that state
product liability laws are laws of general applicability); Kemats v. Smith Indus. Med. Sys., Inc., 669
N.E.2d 1300, 1308-09 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (ruling that although PMA rules are preemptive federal
requirements, state product liability law was not preempted because it was not specifically developed
with respect to medical devices), appeal denied, 675 N.E.2d 634 (Ill. 1996), petitionfor cert.filed,
65 U.S.L.W. 3632 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1997) (No. 96-1405); Walker v. Johnson & Johnson Vision Prods.,
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Most post-Lohr courts reject preemption on the grouad that product
liability claims do not qualify as state requirements within the meaning
of section 360k(a).' 28 Notwithstanding similar outcomes, these courts
have employed different rationales for refusing to treat product liability
claims as state requirements. 29 For instance, the Califbrnia Court of
Appeals relied on FDA regulations1 31 to find that produci liability law is

a law of general applicability that is exempt from preemption. However,
in Kernats v. Smith Industries Medical Systems, Inc.,3 the Illinois Court
of Appeals furnished another reason for rejecting preemption of product
liability claims. Quoting the majority opinion in Lohr, the court declared
that state product liability claims are not preempted by PMA rules
because product liability law is not "specifically developed with respect
to medical devices," and thus its generality
leaves it outside the scope of
132
laws Congress intended to be preempted.
However, in Walker v. Johnson & Johnson Vision Products, Inc.,
the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected preemption on, the basis that
PMA rules are not preemptive federal requirements within the meaning
of section 360k(a). The court interpreted FDA regulations and Lohr to
require that federal rules be device specific to preempt state law. 3 4 It
then concluded that because the PMA rules apply to all non-exempt
class III devices, PMA rules are not
device specific, and thus they do not
35

preempt product liability claims.

In Green v. Dolsky,136 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania adopted a
minority position, finding that PMA requirements preempt state product
Inc., 552 N.W.2d 679, 684-85 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (rejecting preemption of product liability
claims on grounds that PMA rules are not device specific, and state product liability law is law of
general applicability and thus not within scope of section 360k(a)); Connell v. Iolab Corp., 927
S.W.2d 848, 853 (Mo. 1996) (applying form of conflict preemption analysis tD find that plaintiff's
product liability claims survive preemption because manufacturer was physically unable to comply
with requirements imposed by state claims and those imposed by MDA rules), cert. dismissed, 65
U.S.L.W. 3815 (U.S. June 4, 1997) (No. R46-01 1); Sowell v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 656 N.Y.S.2d
16, 20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997) (rejecting preemption in case of contact lens that had undergone PMA
review because PMA rules are not device specific). But see Green, 685 A.2d at 117-18 (finding that
PMA rules preempt certain types of state product liability claims).
128. See, e.g., Armstrong,50 Cal. App. 4th at 595-96; Kernats, 669 N.E.2d at 1308-09.
129. See cases cited supranote 128.
130. Armstrong, 50 Cal. App. 4th at 595.
131. 669 N.E.2d 1300, 1309 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); accordSowell,656 N.Y.S.2d at 19-23.
132. Id. at 1309 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240,2258 (1996)).
133. 552 N.W.2d 679, 684 (Mich. CL App. 1996).
134. Id. at 685.
135. Id at 684.
136. 685 A.2d 110, 117-18 (Pa. 1996).
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liability claims. In Dolsky, the plaintiff sued her doctor and Collagen
Corporation after she allegedly developed an auto immune reaction after
receiving an injection of Zyderm."' Without discussion, the court
assumed that state product liability claims are within the scope of the
section 360k(a) and that PMA rules constitute preemptive federal
requirements. a8 Ultimately, the court held that all of the plaintiffs
discernible product liability claims were preempted because they would
have required a judge or jury "to substitute a reasonableness analysis
characteristic of negligence claims for the judgment of the FDA in
approving the... particular product in the course of its premarket
approval process."' 39 The Dolsky court concluded that product liability
actions are preempted to the extent that they invade the field of PMA
review. 4°
IlI. PMA RULES SHOULD PREEMPT PRODUCT LIABILITY
CLAIMS THAT INVOLVE ASPECTS OF DEVICES
ADDRESSED BY PMA RULES
The Lohr decision leaves ample room for courts to treat PMA rules as
federal requirements that preempt state product liability claims. The U.S.
Supreme Court's rationale for refusing to grant preemptive effect to
section 510k rules and general controls supports preemption in the
context of devices subject to PMA rules.14 ' Moreover, finding that PMA
rules preempt product liability claims is consistent with interpretative
regulations promulgated by the FDA. 42 In the wake of Lohr, however,
only certain product liability claims should be preempted. 43 Determining
which claims are displaced by PMA rules requires careful analysis of the
product defect underlying the state law claim, the nature of the PMA
rules governing the device, and the purpose of the MDA.'"

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 113.
See id at 117.
Id.
Id
See infra Part II.B.I.
See infra Part llr.B.2.
See supra Part ll.C.2 (discussing how Lohr Court unanimously agreed that claims alleging

violations ofMDA were not preempted).
144. See Feldt v. Mentor Corp., 61 F.3d 431, 435-37 (5th Cir. 1995) (using similar approach to
determine whether federal rules governing substantially similar device preempted state product
liability claims).
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Before a court may hold that PMA rules preempt a plaintiff's state
product liability claim, it must resolve three issues. First, the court must
decide whether product liability claims are within the intended scope of
section 360k(a). Second, the court must determine whether PMA rules
trigger preemption of state product liability claims. Third, the court must
establish which state claims PMA rules preempt.
A.

State ProductLiability Claims Should Be Treatedas State
Requirements Within the Meaning of Section 360k(a)

A majority of the Court in Lohr found that state product liability
claims may be preempted under the MDA.145 Nonetheless, several postLohr courts have ignored this finding and have instead held that product
liability claims are outside the scope of section 360k(a).' 46 To reach this
conclusion, courts misinterpret a section in the majority opinion in Lohr
and misconstrue FDA regulations.
1.

Courts Have MisinterpretedLohr as Excluding ProductLiability
Claimsfrom Preemption

Courts that place state product liability claims outside the intended
scope of section 360k(a) have invariably relied upon one passage in the
principal opinion in Lohr.47 In this passage, the four plurality justices,
joined by Justice Breyer, rejected preemption on the grounds that not
only were the federal rules governing the pacemaker not sufficiently
specific to warrant preemption, but also because the plaintiffs' state
claims "were not specifically developed 'with respect to' medical
devices."' 48 The Court reasoned that because the legal obligations
underlying the plaintiffs' state claims apply to all product manufacturers,
the claims did not interfere with a specific federal interest advanced by
the MDA and thus should not be preempted.'4 9 Several post-Lohr courts
have cited this passage to support the proposition that product liability

145. See supraPart ll.C.2.
146. See cases cited supranote 127.
147. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240,2258 (1996).
148. Id.
149. Id.
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claims are never preempted by federal device rules because such claims
are never developed specifically with respect to medical devices. 5
Although five justices joined the section of the opinion containing this
passage,'-' it cannot be considered the opinion of the Court because it is
inconsistent with Justice Breyer's separate opinion. This passage imposes
a condition that cannot be satisfied because theories of product liability
are never formulated exclusively with respect to medical devices. 5
Rather, they develop gradually and apply to all types of products.'53
Thus, if the condition were imposed, no product liability claims would
ever be preempted under the MDA. But this result cannot be reconciled
with Justice Breyer's explicit finding in his separate opinion that product
liability claims are preempted to the same extent as positive enactments
of law.'54 Because Justice Breyer wrote a separate opinion to highlight
his disagreement with the plurality concerning product liability claims,' 55
and because without Justice Breyer's vote the passage is supported by
only four other justices, the condition the passage imposes does not in
fact constitute the law of the land and should not be relied upon by
courts. Instead, Justice Breyer's and the four dissenting justices'
declaration that product liability claims are within the intended scope of
the preemption provision constitutes the opinion of the Court. 5 6
2.

CourtsHave Failed To CarefullyAnalyze FDA Regulations
RegardingPreemption of State Laws

Courts holding that state product liability claims are outside the scope
of the MDA not only misconstrue Lohr, but also incorrectly interpret

150. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Optical Radiation Corp., 50 Cal. App. 4th 580, 595 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996); Walker v. Johnson & Johnson Vision Prods., Inc., 552 N.W.2d 679, 686 (Mich. Ct. App.

1996).
151. Lohr, 116 S.Ct. at2245.

152. See generally W. Page Keeton et al., Prosserand Keeton on the Law of Torts §§ 95-96, at
677-90 (5th ed. 1984) (describing different theories of product liability and how they developed).

153. Id
154. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. at 2260.

155. See idat 2259-60.
156. See Papike v. Tambrands, Inc., 107 F.3d 737, 741 (9th Cir. 1997) (declaring that Ninth
Circuit's earlier holding in Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1453 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 2579 (1996), that state product liability claims are never preempted under MDA could not
"survive in light of the concurring and dissenting opinions in [Lohr]'.
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FDA regulations. 5 7 FDA regulations specify that laws of general
applicability are not generally preempted under section 360k(a))'
Based on this language, some courts make the cursory determination that
state product liability claims are not preempted.'59
By ending their inquiry here, these courts fail to consider two other
important sections in the regulations that support preemption of some
state claims."6 First, the regulations specify that state requirements may
take the form of court decisions.' 6 ' Because court decisions are the
vehicle by which product liability claims impose requirements, the
characterization of court decisions as state requirements strongly
suggests that product liability claims are within the scope of the MDA.'6 2
Second, the regulations state an exception to the rule that laws of general
applicability escape preemption. 3 This exception provides that when
laws of general applicability have "the effect of establishing a
substantive requirement for a specific device," they are preempted to the
same extent as other state laws."6 Product liability claims fall under this
exception because they effectively establish substantive requirements for
specific devices. 65 A majority of the Lohr Court explicitly recognized
this point when they declared that "[state] regulation can be as
effectively exerted through an award of damages as through some form
of preventative relief."'" Because product liability claims do in fact
impose substantive duties, they should be treated as a state requirement
and should be preempted to the extent that they impose different or
additional requirements.167

157.
1996);
1996).
158.
159.

See, e.g., Armstrong v. Optical Radiation Corp., 50 Cal. App. 4th 580, 595 (Cal. Ct. App.
Walker v. Johnson & Johnson Vision Prods., Inc., 552 N.W.2d 679, 6E4-85 (Mich. Ct. App.
21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(1) (1996).
See, e.g., Armstrong, 50 Cal. App. 4th at 595; Walker, 552 N.W.2d at 684-85.

160. See 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(b), (d)(6)(ii).
161. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(b).
162. See Herrmann & Ritts, supra note 8, at 16-18.
163. See 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(6)(ii).
164. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(6Xii).
165. See Herrmann & Ritts, supra note 8, at 17.
166. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 2259 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring); Id. at 2262
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521 (1992)).
167. See infra Part IILC for a discussion of which product liability claims PMA rules preempt.
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B.

PMA Rules Should Be Treatedas Preemptive Federal
Requirements

Once a court finds that state product liability claims are within the
scope of section 360k(a), it must determine whether PMA rules trigger
preemption of those claims. However, this issue is not easily resolved
because neither Lohr nor the FDA regulations explicitly address whether
PMA rules constitute federal requirements within the meaning of section
360k(a). Nonetheless, the Lohr Court's reasoning for refusing to grant
preemptive effect to section 510k rules and general controls supports
treating PMA rules as preemptive federal requirements. Moreover, under
FDA regulations interpreting section 360k(a), PMA rules logically
qualify as preemptive federal requirements.
1.

Lohr's ReasoningSupports TreatingPMA Rules as Preemptive
FederalRequirements

Noting that the purpose of a statute is the 'touchstone' in every
preemption case," the Lohr Court found that section 510k rules and
general controls do not preempt state law because a contrary finding
would be inconsistent with the overall purpose of the MDA as well as the
specific purpose of the preemption provision.1 6' The Court observed that
the overall purpose of the MDA is to protect consumers from unsafe and
ineffective medical devices.' 69 However, section 510k rules merely
ensure equivalency and not the safety of devices. 70 The Court reasoned
that treating section 510k rules as preemptive federal requirements would
have the perverse effect of leaving the safety of substantially equivalent
devices less regulated than they were before the passage of the MDA.17 1
Before Congress granted the FDA the authority to regulate devices, the
Court observed that the safety of devices was at least regulated by
product liability lawsuits.
For this reason, the Court concluded that
Congress did not intend for section 510k rules to preempt state product
73
liability law.

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Lohr, 116 S. Ct. at 2254-55.
Id.; see also supra note 22.
Lohr, 116 S. Ct. at 2254.
Il at 2255.
Id.
Id.
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The Court also found that the specific purpose of the preemption
provision was not furthered by treating 510k rules and general controls
as preemptive federal requirements. 74 According to the Court, federal
rules should preempt state law only when those rules promote specific
federal interests.' Using this criterion, the Court explaiaed that section
51 Ok rules and general controls do not trigger preemption because these
rules "reflect important but entirely generic concern: about device
regulation generally, not the sort of concerns regarding a specific device
or field of device regulation which ... [the preemption provision was]
designed to protect from potentially contradictory state requirements.' 7 6
When the Court's reasoning is applied to devices subject to PMA
rules, preemption is appropriate. PMA rules advance the overall purpose
of the MDA because the PMA process is directly concemed with a
device's safety and effectiveness. 17 PMA applications must be extremely
detailed to give the FDA enough data to make informed safety
determinations. 7 1 If the FDA is not satisfied with a PMA application, it
may require a manufacturer to submit additional information or conduct
further testing, or the FDA may refuse to approve a device entirely.'
Even after the FDA grants premarket approval of a device, it may either
conditionally or permanently revoke its approval, thus forcing the device
off of the market.8 0 Given the overall purpose of the MDA, and the
PMA process's focus on safety, it is appropriate to treat PMA rules as
preemptive federal requirements.
Moreover, treating PMA rules as preemptive federal requirements is
consistent with the notion of limiting the scope of the preemption
provision to only those state laws that interfere with specific federal
interests.' 8' During PMA review, the FDA makes complex scientific and
policy decisions, assessing whether the benefits of devices outweigh the
known risks. 2 Rather than "reflecting entirely generic concerns about
174. Id. at 2258.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(2) (1994) (authorizing FDA to deny approval of PMA
application absent showing of reasonable assurance that device is safe and effective).
178. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c) (describing extensive information that PMAA application must

contain).
179. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 814.44-.45 (1996).
180. 21 C.F.R. § 814.46 (outlining FDA procedures for revoking PMA of device).
181. SeeLohr, 116 S. Ct. at2258.
182. See 21 C.F.R. § 860.7(b)(3) (1996) (describing factors FDA must consider in assessing

whether to grant PMA).
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device regulation generally," the difficult choices that the FDA makes
about each device that is subject to PMA review are exactly the kind of
federal regulations that the preemption provision was designed to protect
from potentially contradictory state requirements.183
2.

FDA Regulations Support Findingthat PMA Rules Preempt
ProductLiability Claims

Because the Lohr Court adopted the FDA's definition of a federal
requirement,' courts should rely on FDA regulations to determine
whether PMA rules qualify as federal requirements. Although FDA
regulations do not state explicitly whether PMA rules trigger preemption,
the FDA's definition of a preemptive federal requirement logically
encompasses PMA rules. Under the regulations, federal rules qualify as
federal requirements if either (1) they are specific rules enacted by
Congress that are applicable to a particular device, or (2) they are
specific counterpart regulations promulgated by the FDA that are
applicable to a particular device." 5 Although the categories differ in that
each encompasses requirements originating from different sources, both
1 6
categories require that rules be device specific to trigger preemption. 1
Under this definition, PMA rules do not fall under the first category
because those PMA rules enacted by Congress are not device specific 7
Instead, PMA rules apply to all non-exempt class III devices. 8 8 Congress
left the task of crafting device-specific rules to the FDA.'
PMA rules, however, do qualify as federal requirements under the
second category because of the way the FDA tailors PMA review to each
particular device."' PMA rules require manufacturers to submit in a

183. See Roger W. Bivans, Note, Substantially Equivalent? Federal Preemption of State
Common-Law Claims Involving Medical Devices, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1087, 1110 (1996) (arguing that
PMA process "is more than a broad procedural framework" but instead involves extensive testing
and review of devices, and thus PMA rules should be treated as preemptive federal requirements).
184. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. at 2257.
185. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (1996).
186. See Duvall v. Bristol-Myers-Squibb Co., 103 F.3d 324, 330 (4th Cir. 1996) (observing that
Lohr Court's interpretation of FDA regulations dictates that federal rules be device specific to
preempt state law).
187. In fact, no particular device is singled out for individual treatment in the MDA.
188. See supraPart I.B.
189. See supranote 78.
190. See John D. Burnside, Comment, Kennedy v. Collagen Corp.: Fallingfrom the Medical
Device Amendments' FederalPreemption Garden, 28 Ariz. St. L. 949, 971 (1996) (observing that
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PMA application detailed information regarding the product's design,
manufacturing, marketing, labeling, packaging, and distribution. 9 ' After
the FDA approves a PMA application, manufacturers must comply with
those design, labeling, and production parameters specified in the
application.192 Because manufacturers are constrained in the changes they
may make after the FDA grants PMA, the FDA-approved application

operates as a specific counterpart regulation that is uniqueLy applicable to
that particular
requirements.
C.

device, and thus PMA

rules constitute

federal

A Frameworkfor Identifying Which ProductLiability Claims PMA
Rules Preempt

After a court has determined that product liability claims qualify as
state requirements and PMA rules trigger preemption, it; must identify
which claims PMA rules preempt. Lohr makes clear that PMA rules

preempt only those state laws that impose different or additional
requirements.'9 3 Product liability claims impose different or additional

requirements when claims are based on allegations that a manufacturer
should have done something more or different than required by PMA
rules."9 Put another way, PMA rules should preempt state product
liability claims when such claims involve aspects of devices already
addressed by PMA rules. 95 Therefore, the task is to identify what aspects
of devices PMA rules address, and then to identify the extent to which
state claims invade the domain of PMA rules.
Although product liability laws vary among states,' 9 there are
essentially three theories of recovery available to injured plaintiffs:
PMA process qualifies as specific requirement applicable to particular device because FDA makes
specific finding of safety and effectiveness for each device under examination).
191. See Armstrong v. Optical Radiation Corp., 50 Cal. App. 4th 580, 594 (C-. Ct. App. 1996).
192. 21 C.F.R. § 814.80 (1996). When a manufacturer alters its product, it must notify the FDA.
21 C.F.R. § 814.39(b). Any changes that adversely affect the safety or effectiveness of a device must
be specifically approved by the FDA. 21 C.F.R. §§ 814.39(a)-(b).
193. See supra Part ll.C.2.
194. See Green v. Dolsky, 685 A.2d 110, 118 (Pa. 1996) (arguing that to "allow a strict liability
claim for a product specifically approved by the FDA would be to impose 'requirements' which are
different from those of the FDA .... ").
195. See Feldt v. Mentor Corp., 61 F.3d 431, 435-37 (5th Cir. 1995) (applying same analysis in
case of a substantially similar device to determine whether general controls and section 510k rules
preempted plaintiff's product liability claims).
196. Henry Grabowski, ProductLiability in Pharmaceuticals:Comments on ChaptersEight and
Nine, in The Liability Maze: The Impact of Liability Law on Safety and Innovation 363 (Peter W.
Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991).
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(1) breach of warranty, express or implied; (2) negligence; and (3) strict
liability. 97 Below is an overview of which claims the PMA rules should
preempt.
Breach of express and implied warranty claims should not be treated
uniformly for preemption purposes. Because express warranties are not
created by state law, but instead arise through promises made by private
parties,19 they do not run afoul of the section 360k(a) prohibition on
states establishing or enforcing requirements relating to devices."'
Accordingly, neither PMA rules nor any other federal requirements
should preempt express warranty claims. On the other hand, state law
imposes implied warranties even when contracting parties have made no
express promises.2" One such warranty is the implied warranty of fitness
of purpose, which establishes a duty on merchants to supply products
that are suited for their intended purpose." t A claim for breach of an
implied warranty of fitness requires a court to find that a product is
unsuitable for the purpose for which it was marketed. 2 When a court
rules on a breach of implied warranty claim involving a device to which
the FDA granted PMA, the court, in effect, substitutes its judgment
regarding a device's safety for the FDA's determination that the device
was safe for its intended use. Therefore, PMA rules should preempt
claims of breach of implied warranty of fitness.
Although strict liability and negligence actions differ significantly, in
the final analysis both types of claims should be treated similarly for
preemption purposes. Negligence actions focus on how a defendant's
failure to exercise reasonable care resulted in a plaintiff's injury. 0 3 In

197. See Keeton et al., supranote 152, at 694.
198. See U.C.C. § 2-313 (1994) (describing different ways that sellers may create express

warranties).
199. Kemats v. Smith Indus. Med. Sys., Inc., 669 N.E.2d 1300, 1310 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (finding

that breach of express warranty claims are not preempted under MDA because requirements are not
imposed under state law, but imposed by warrantor), appeal denied, 675 N.E.2d 634 (Ill. 1996),
petitionforcert.filed,65 U.S.L.W. 3632 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1997) (No. 96-1405).
200. See U.C.C. §§ 2-313, -315 (1994) (creating implied warranties that goods must meet minimal
standard according to trade, and must be fit for particular purpose that purchasers intended if seller is

aware of this purpose).
201. U.C.C. § 2-315 ("Where the seller... has reason to know... [the] purpose for which the
goods are required ... there is... an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.").
The U.C.C. also establishes an implied warranty of merchantability, which requires that goods
conform to industry standards. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (1994).
202. See U.C.C. § 2-315.
203. Kathleen A. Touby, ProductLiabilityand the Device Industry, 43 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 55,

61(1988).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 72:963, 1997

contrast, strict liability actions focus on the product itself and whether it
is unreasonably dangerous. 2" Nonetheless, under either theory plaintiffs
must prove that a product is defective,"' and under both theories the
types of product defects are largely the same.2" Because the type of
product defect involved in a claim will dictate those aspects of a device
that a court's judgment will regulate, strict liability and negligence
claims should be analyzed in the same manner.
Under either a negligence or a strict liability theory, products may be
defective in three primary ways: (1) there is a flaw in the product that
makes it more dangerous than intended; 0 7 (2) the product information
fails to warn or lacks a sufficient warning about a risk inherent in the
way the product is designed; 28 and (3) a product's design is defective
and dangerous. 9 PMA rules preempt claims involving all three defects
because PMA rules address all of those aspects of the devices associated
with these product defects
PMA rules should preempt claims alleging that a device's flaw was
created or not discovered during the manufacturing process, because
PMA rules require manufacturers to submit a description of the methods,
facilities, and controls used for manufacturing devices. 2'0 PMA rules
should preempt this type of claim because the FDA determines whether
the manufacturing processes and controls specified in a PMA application
are sufficient to guard against the creation of flaws and are adequate to
ensure the discovery of those flaws that are created.' Allowing a
plaintiff to maintain a negligence or strict liability action against a
manufacturer that has complied with FDA regulations subjects a
manufacturer to additional state requirements in an area aheady regulated
by PMA rules.

204. Keeton et al., supranote 152, at 695.
205. Charles J. Walsh & Marc S. Klein, The ConflictingObjectives ofFederaland State Tort Law
DrugRegulation,41 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 171, 172 (1986).
206. See Keeton et al., supra note 152, at 685 (describing three types of product defects under
negligence theory); id. at 695-97 (outlining almost identical types of product defects under strict
liability).
207. Id. at 685, 695.
208. Id at 685, 697.
209. Id. at 688, 698. Courts use different tests for assessing whether a product's design is
hazardous in negligence and strict liability actions. Id
210. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(lXC) (1994); 21 C.F.R. § 814.20(b)(4)(v) (1996).
211. See 21 C.F.R. § 814.20(b)(4)(v) (requiring that PMA application adequz.tely explain quality
control processes so that FDA can make knowledgeable assessment of controls).
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Likewise, PMA rules should also preempt defective warning claims
because the FDA reviews specimens of proposed labeling and product
information submitted in all PMA applications." When the FDA is not
satisfied with draft warning information, it may condition final approval
of a device on the manufacturers' willingness to include changes as
specified by the FDA. 21'3 Because premarket approval of a device
involves close scrutiny of device labels, 214 defective warning claims
impose different or additional requirements and thus should be
preempted.
Finally, PMA rules should preempt defective design claims because
5
the FDA reviews the design of a product during PMA review and
grants approval only after determining that the probable health benefits
of the device outweigh the probable risks. 21 6 Therefore, a defective
design claim should be preempted because it requires a court to
substitute its cost-benefit analysis for that of the FDA concerning the
utility of marketing a product.
Although PMA rules should preempt most product liability claims,
plaintiffs will not necessarily be without recourse in state court. The Lohr
Court made clear that plaintiffs' state product liability claims alleging
violations of MDA rules were not preempted because such claims are not
2 7
different from, or in addition to, federal device requirements. "
Consequently, when a plaintiff's state law claims are predicated on an
allegation that a defect resulted from a manufacturer violating PMA
rules, such as a manufacturer's failure to comply with those quality
control processes specified in its PMA application, such a claim would
survive preemption.2 18

212. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(F); 21 C.F.R. § 814.20(b)(10).
213. See 21 C.F.R. § 814.44(d).
214. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1)(F) (requiring manufacturers to submit to FDA draft labeling
instructions); 21 C.F.IL § 860.7 (1996) (mandating that device reviewers consider whether device
labels are adequate before reviewers may grant PMA).
215. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(B); 21 C.F.R. § 814.20.
216. 21 C.F.t. § 860.7(b)(3).
217. See supraPart II.C.2.
218. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2255 (1996).
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IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS SUPPORT PREEMPTING
PRODUCT LIABILITY CLAIMS THAT INTERFERE WITH
PMA RULES
PMA rules and product liability law share common goals of deterring
the production and sale of devices that fail to conform to a certain
standard of safety. 9 However, these two methods of device regulation
accomplish their shared goals in very different ways. Federal rules
prospectively regulate devices by establishing uniform national standards
against which scientists evaluate the safety of devices.2" In contrast, state
product liability claims retrospectively regulate devices and potentially
subject manufacturers to a different set of rules in each state.'
Moreover, in state product liability lawsuits, judges and juries rather than
experts make safety determinations. 2 Given the complexity and
importance of medical devices to human health, and the FDA's unique
qualifications to make decisions regarding device regalation, courts
should not regulate devices subject to PMA rules.23 When courts attempt
to co-regulate devices, their activities are at best redundant; at worst,
they subject manufacturers to contradictory and unclear standards, they
risk making medical devices less affordable and available, and they
threaten to frustrate the federal regulation of devices.
Preemption of product liability claims by PMA rules is not only
consistent with the overall purpose of the MDA, but it also furthers the
specific purpose of the MDA's preemption clause. 4 Congress included
an express preemption provision in the MDA to ensure that
manufacturers are not unduly burdened by dual regulation of devices by
both the states and the federal government."s Product liability actions
frustrate this purpose because manufacturers must comply with each
state's product liability law to avoid liability losses, even though they
have completed the stringent PMA process and the FDA has determined
that their products are reasonably safe and effective. Given the exacting
219. Foote, supra note 2, at 138.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. But see Adler & Mann, supra note 8, at 945 (arguing that FDA alone cannot adequately
protect consumers from dangerous devices).
224. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-853, at 45 (1976), reprinted in An Analytical Legislative History of the
Medical Device Amendments of 1976, app. II (Daniel F. O'Keefe, Jr. et al. eds., 1976); see also
supra Part II.A.
225. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-853, at 45.
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nature of PMA review and the hardships it imposes on manufacturers,
treating PMA rules as preemptive federal requirements that displace
product liability claims furthers Congress's objective of reducing the
unnecessary regulatory burdens on manufacturers.
Commentators advance two main policy arguments for imposing
liability on manufacturers of defective consumer products. 226 First,
liability promotes product safety because damage awards provide an
incentive to manufacturers to make products safer to avoid liability
losses. 7 Second, product liability spreads a plaintiff's losses among
those who benefit from a product. 8 Manufacturers who are forced to
pay damage awards can pass on the costs to their other customers in the
form of higher sales prices. 229 Nonetheless, these policy arguments are
not as compelling in the case of PMA devices as in the context of other
consumer goods.
Manufacturers of devices that are subject to PMA review have strong
incentives to make products safe regardless of liability concerns. In
contrast to manufacturers of minimally regulated products, device
manufacturers must ensure that their products meet stringent FDA
standards."3 Even minor safety problems will lead the FDA to postpone
premarket approval of a product until the agency's concerns are
allayed." Because approval delays impose significant costs on2
manufacturers, estimated between $15,000 and $1 million per month,
and often lead smaller companies to borrow money, lay off employees,
or decide not to develop new products in the future, z3 device

226. Laura K. Jortberg, Note, Who Should Bear the Burden of Experimental Medical Device
Testing: The Preemptive Scope of the Medical Device Amendments Under Slater v. Optical
Radiation Corp., 43 DePaul L. Rev. 963, 981 (1994).
227. The Wilkerson Group, Inc., supranote 62, at 99.
228. Jortberg, supranote 226, at 981.
229. Id at 983.
230. See, e.g., Edward M. Basile, Improving FDA 's Product Approval Process for Medical
Devices, 41 Food Drug Cosm. L.J., 287, 290 (1986) (describing costs to manufacturers of approval
delays).
231. See Regulating Innovation: FDA's Medical Device Approval Process: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Investigationsand Oversightof the House Comm. on Science, Space, and Technology,
103d Cong. 146 (1993) (statement of Dr. Susan Alpert, Acting Director, Office of Device Education,

FDA) (responding to criticism from device manufacturers that FDA reviewers delay device approval
by requesting irrelevant information from manufacturers).
232. Basile, supra note 230, at 290 (citing Tucker & Blozan, PMA Applications for PostAmendment Devices: A Look at the CurrentProcess,MDDI Reports, June 1985, at 94).
233. id, at 291.
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manufacturers are likely to make their products as safe as possible even

if product liability actions are preempted.
Moreover, product liability actions are a flawed method of ensuring
safety because they send a vague signal to manufacturers. Product

liability law fails to adequately convey to manufacturers how to be more
careful or how careful they should be.234 Although manufacturers of
many consumer goods may be able to alter their behavior in response to
product liability lawsuits because needed safety modifications are
obvious, this is not the case for manufacturers of many medical devices
subject to PMA review because of the complexity and sensitivity of
many of these devices. 35 Modifications to such devices may produce
unintended and unforeseeable consequences, which might render devices
even more unsafe. Consequently, manufacturers of PMA devices are less
capable of improving product safety in response to lawsuits than

manufacturers of other consumer goods.
Spreading injured plaintiffs' losses also is not necessarily desirable in
the case of medical devices. Large damage awards can force
manufacturers to remove vital products from the market to minimize
liability exposure," or the awards may drive some companies out of
business.2 In fact, in the 1980s, as childhood vaccine manufacturers
faced increased liability exposure, a drastic decline in the number of
manufacturers threatened to cause a worldwide shortage of vaccines for
polio, measles, mumps, and rubella.238 If the current liability laws operate
unchecked, we risk delaying or making unavailable life-saving medical
devices. 9
234. See Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan, Overview, in The Liability Mazr, supra note 196, at
1,5.
235. Although some relatively simple devices are categorized as cla;s III devices, the
classification scheme was designed to ensure that the most complex and vital devices are subject to
PMA review. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-853, at 35 (1976), reprinted in An Analytical LegislativeHistory
of the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, app. II (Daniel F. O'Keefe, Jr. et al. eds., 1976)
(describing how Congress wanted to require premarket approval for devices that are of particular
importance to human health).
236. See Foote, supra note 2, at 148-49.
237. The Wilkerson Group, Inc., supra note 62, at 105 (describing how worst case scenarios
factor heavily into decision making).
238. Charles F. Hagan, Vaccine Compensation Schemes, 45 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 477, 479
(1990). Concerned about the effects of state product liability law on the supply of vaccines, Congress
enacted the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa (1994), which
established a national trust fund to compensate children injured by vaccines if they choose to forego
suits against vaccine manufacturers. Id. at 479-80.
239. See Herrmann & Ritts, supra note 8, at 13-14 (arguing that social cost-, of product liability
lawsuits in case of medical devices are much more severe than for other products).

Preemption of Product Liability Claims by the MDA
The threat of large damage awards not only forces existing products
off the market, but such awards also have a chilling effect on product
development and innovation.240 For example, many device manufacturers
will not invest money in the research and development of devices that
have high potential liability costs such as anesthesiology, intrauterine
contraceptive devices, and many pediatric applications of existing
technologies.24 When it is not cost-effective for manufacturers to
develop new devices, consumers pay the price in unnecessary and
unrelieved suffering.242
Finally, product liability actions allow judges and juries to secondguess the FDA's scientific and policy decisions.243 This is improper
given that Congress granted the FDA authority to review the safety and
effectiveness of medical devices and make complex policy choices
concerning whether a device should be marketed at all, and under what
conditions. 2" The FDA is staffed with scientific experts who are more
qualified than judges or juries to assess product safety.245 Moreover, the
FDA is better equipped than courts to make policy decisions regarding
medical devices because it can more accurately weigh the overall benefit
to society against the potential harms of marketing a product.246 Given
the comprehensiveness and rigor of the PMA process, courts should
defer to the specific scientific and policy judgments made by the FDA.247
V.

CONCLUSION

In Lohr, the U.S. Supreme Court failed to resolve the question of
whether premarket approval of a device shields a manufacturer from
liability actions. Because PMA devices are vital to human health, and
their availability and affordability has severe consequences for many
240. See, e.g., Foote, supra note 2, at 7-8 (citing adverse impact of liability on contraception
research and development).
241. The Wilkerson Group, Inc., supra note 62, at 106.
242. See, e.g., Pennington P. Landen, FederalPreemption and the Drug Industry: Can Courts
Co-Regulate?, 43 Food Drug Cosm. LJ. 85, 119 (1988) (observing that "spectre of liability-despite
FDA approval-chills the manufacturer's incentive to develop new products").
243. Jortberg, supra note 226, at 984.
244. 21 C.F.R. § 860.7 (1996) (describing considerations FDA must make in assessing whether
product should receive premarket approval).
245. See Jortberg, supra note 226, at 985.
246. See Walsh & Klein, supra note 205, at 193 (observing that in context of federal drug rules,
courts are ill-equipped to make complex risk-utility judgments about whether drugs should be

marketed at all).
247. See id
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Americans, this question is too important to leave unanswered. Congress
included an express preemption clause in the MDA to ensure that state
laws do not interfere with the uniform federal regulation of medical
devices. PMA rules establish a comprehensive process by which the
FDA rigorously scrutinizes nearly every aspect of a device's labeling,
design, and manufacturing. Allowing plaintiffs to sue manufacturers of
devices governed by PMA rules, despite manufacturers' full compliance
with the rules, thwarts the purpose behind the preemption provision of
freeing manufacturers from duplicative state requirements. Moreover,
both the reasoning of Lohr and FDA interpretive regulations support
preempting product liability claims that attempt to regalate aspects of
devices already addressed by PMA rules. Consequently, courts should
treat PMA rules as preemptive federal requirements that displace state
product liability claims to the extent that such claims impose
requirements on devices that are different from, or in addition to, PMA
rules.

